Why did nasser nationalized the suez canal yahoo dating

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why did nasser nationalized the suez canal yahoo dating

*Corresponding author email: [email protected] Symbiosis Group world. The canal is owned and maintained by the Suez Canal Authority. (SCA) of Egypt. . Canal Origins Date back to Ancient Egypt. The modern Suez Canal . Nasser nationalized the canal, hoping to charge tolls that would. mob-con.info) Subject: Gabril's Hero, Gamal Abd al-Nasser: "Hitler of the Nile" & the Suez Crisis (was: Another NNTP-Posting-Date: Sun, 25 Jul 21 Suez Crisis (was: Another letter from Palestine - Hunger strike against nationalize the Suez Canal using the proceeds to fund their Aswan dam. Mention the Suez Canal and the United Nations – and what would come to Nasser announced nationalization of the Suez Canal Company July 26, ! By Karl Lyimo, [email protected] The 'common denominator' between the ' Suez Canal' and the 'United Nations' is that it was on a date like.

Table of Contents The short history of the state of Israel is replete with wars. One of the lesser known Arab-Israeli wars was the Sinai War. On October 29,Israel attacked Egyptian forces in the Sinai Peninsula, and the air forces of Britain and France joined the offensive two days later on October On November 5, British and French ground forces landed on the banks of the Suez Canal and started to follow it southward.

In concert, Israel completed its conquest of the Sinai Peninsula without its army, the I. On November 7, the major superpowers of the era — the United States and the Soviet Union — issued two separate ultimatums forcing Britain and France respectively to halt their attempted seizure of the Suez Canal and, with this, the episode appeared to come to an end. In Israeli collective memory, the Sinai War has all but disappeared, nestled between two other wars that, on the face of things, appear to have been more important: In British memory, French memory, and the memory of other involved parties, the Sinai War has blended into the final wars of the two declining empires and the abundance of other Cold War related events that took place during the period.

Nonetheless, the Sinai War has great historic significance that memory has been unable to preserve. This is true both on the international level and in the cases of Israel and Egypt respectively. Although this short article focuses primarily on the war from the perspective of Israel, the discussion will be contextualized within the histories of the other parties involved in the war, including: The Sinai War was fought within the historical framework of the Cold War, which was at its height in the mids.

WWII had resulted in two opposing international blocs. One was led by the United States and consisted of the U.

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British and French self-perceptions, and the role of the two countries within NATO, played an important role in the outbreak of the war in October and the developments that followed. This bloc consisted primarily of the Eastern European countries that the Soviets had first liberated from Nazi occupation and subsequently forced to establish communist regimes. In addition to these countries, the Soviet bloc also included countries located adjacent to the border of the Soviet Union, as well as countries ruled by local communist parties.

This group was joined by Egypt and a number of the new developing countries of Asia and Africa that emerged with the collapse of the old empires.

In addition to other countries that had not been clearly classified as belonging to one bloc or the other, the members of this bloc were actively courted and pressured by the two dominant superpowers.

From this perspective, the world of the s can be seen as a vast playing field, no part of which could be left outside the influence of one of the two blocs because it might come under the influence of the opposing one. Through a series of conventional regional wars, and in some cases by preventing such wars, the two superpowers worked to advance their interests. Without the above brief description of the Cold War, it is impossible to understand the Sinai Warthe factors that sparked it and influenced the way it was conducted and concluded, and its outcome.

The Sinai War must be understood as the climax of one of the most important crises in the history of the Cold War: This unusual display of cooperation stemmed from the unique nature of the Suez Crisis, which reflected a hitherto unprecedented crisis within NATO as Britain and France worked together to invade Egypt against the explicit position of the United States.

The rift that resulted threatened the existence of NATO. The crisis was fueled by considerations that the parties regarded as critical at the time, as well as the complex feelings of people who had recently been leaders of first-rank superpowers but who in the political and military realities of were simply no longer as important. On the political level and, most importantly, on the level of consciousness, many people in Britain and France had not yet accepted the new realities, and the leaders of these two countries were no exception.

In the s, British and French interests in Egypt remained a central element of the international and regional policy of both countries. In addition, Egypt had long been in the midst of an important process of exploring its relations with both Cold War blocs.

After all, the Suez Canal was considered one of the most important strategic assets in the region, and the country itself was located on the border of Africa and Asia. After WWIIEgypt, like other young countries in the Middle East, was in the process of trying to find its internal national character and its place in the international arena. Nasser sought a neutral place for Egypt in the international arena, between the two Cold War blocs.

This approach was based on the assumption that the independence of such a status would enable post-colonial Egypt to position itself in a manner that would be beneficial to its security and its unstable economy.

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  • Suez Crisis

Nasser also believed that such a policy would enable Egypt to play a central role in the Arab world and beyond. It also explains why the Egyptian president refused to join the American inspired anti-Soviet Baghdad Pact that was established the same year. This angered the Western powers, especially the staunchly anti-communist Eisenhower Administrationwhich viewed the arms deal as creating an opportunity for Soviet penetration of the Middle Eastwhich until that point had been exclusively under the sphere of influence of the United States and its allies: America wasted no time in exerting its own pressure.

The Eisenhower administration informed Egypt that if it did not back out of the arms deal with Czechoslovakia, Washington would withdraw its commitment to help fund the construction of the Aswan Dam. Nasser, however, was not willing to consider this option, and on July 19, the United States announced that it would not be funding the dam and the International Monetary Fund followed suit.

One month earlier, on June 13,the last British soldier had left the Suez Canal under the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty ofand Egypt now enjoyed exclusive control of the Canal.

why did nasser nationalized the suez canal yahoo dating

On July 26, at a mass rally in Alexandria marking the anniversary of the coup, Nasser announced that in response to the American decision, his government had resolved to nationalize the Suez Canal Company. This was the company that had dug the Canal during the s and that had maintained it ever since.

The Egyptian decision to nationalize this company, which was traded primarily on the London and Paris stock exchanges, marked the beginning of the Suez Crisis, which culminated in the Sinai War. It also turns out that Nasser was not the only one who saw his actions in this light. Washington also believed that Nasser should be allowed to blow off some steam while the political and economic pressure on him continued.

In stark contrast, London and Paris regarded nationalization of the Canal Company as an act with tremendous immediate significance.

Washington viewed the events through the lens of the Cold War, or the premise that instability and war anywhere in the world, and particularly in regions in which the West was dominant, provided an opportunity for Soviet penetration. For this reason, President Eisenhower asked Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to respond to the Egyptian declaration with moderation to prevent it from becoming a weapon in the hands of the Egyptian president.

The developments must also be considered against the backdrop of trade with the East as a whole and the transport of oil in particular, as well as Cold War defense interests and the prospects of a third world war. The United States shared these interests as well, but attempted to secure them through methods it regarded as more modern and up to date than the classical imperialist model employed by Britain and France, which held that a local leader who behaves improperly should be removed from power as soon as possible.

The first party to react was Britain. This was an extreme response, both in that it was issued immediately and in the content it reflected.

It was based on the current British situation assessment and the personality of the British Prime Minister. Britain, which had only recently extricated itself from the serious economic crisis that resulted in WWII, viewed the oil coming from the Persian Gulf as a necessary precondition for its economic prosperity and, according to some senior members of the British leadership, for its very survival.

why did nasser nationalized the suez canal yahoo dating

Transporting oil around Africa by means of giant tankers was likely to prove economically disastrous, and the Suez Canal remained critically important for Britain.

The British leadership during the mids was, in effect, chasing the ghost of its mighty empire. By this time, it the central parts of the empire were no longer under their control and Britain was losing its tenuous hold over its few remaining colonial territories. In this context, Eden undertook to teach Nasser an imperialist lesson. Since Aprilthe British Prime Minister had been leading a government that had been established by his political patron Winston Churchill, who resigned before the end of his term.

To a certain degree, Eden had built his political image on his opposition to the Munich Pact of as Foreign Secretary.

Egyptian President Nasser announces the seizure of the Suez Canal during his mob-con.info Stock Footage

Now, inhe was determined, as he put it, to not to let another Hitler grow dangerously powerful, even if his name was Nasser. France had experienced a number of disappointments after WWII, including the defeat in Vietnam, which in was still fresh in their minds.

More important in the context of the Canal was the fact that, inFrance was in the midst of a gradually intensifying war in Algeria. The Algerian rebellion against French rule that had erupted in November refused to die out, and more and more French soldiers were being sent back in vain to the territory that the French leadership still regarded as part of metropolitan France. Here too, the desired solution of removing Nasser from power must be understood as stemming in spirit from the imperial past.

Between August and Octoberthe West conducted two parallel campaigns with regard to the Suez Crisis: Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had announced that it would fund the construction of the large dam at Aswan, demonstrating that the poverty of millions of its own people would not stop the Kremlin from providing aid to other countries in which it had political interest.

It was difficult for Eden to act in light of the unwavering opposition of the United States, and the inclusion of France in the plan did not sway Eisenhower from his position. Eden was also having trouble mobilizing support at home. Eden could not even find support from his legal advisors, who explained to him that he had no legal pretext for war against Egypt. In this context, the Prime Minster sunk deeper and deeper into a campaign of half truths and lies that brought him to the verge of undemocratic action.

The French, in contrast, were better prepared for a war with Egypt. France already had forces mobilized for a war in North Africa and it could count on public support by framing its campaign to defend the Suez Canal as part of the same war.

It was at this point during the Suez Crisis that Israel entered the picture. Although officials in London and Paris had already discussed the possibility that Israel might provide them with a pretext for attacking the Suez Canal, it was still not clear how this could happen, which led to a series of negotiations with Israeli representatives were conducted in this spirit.

Suez Crisis - HISTORY

Initially, Israel was not involved in the Suez Crisis. As early asIsrael decided not to actively insist on its right of free passage through the Suez Canal, even though the Egyptian prohibition was ostensibly a casus belli, or a justification for war. Israel, authorities in Jerusalem assessed, had neither the military and operative capability nor the international backing necessary to undertake action to ensure its rights in the Canal. Ben-Gurion had no choice but to support the rising star that had emerged victorious from this domestic Israeli political struggle, particularly after he had been the one who ultimately helped the victor overpower his adversary.

It was a policy based on an optimistic analysis of the outcome of the War, which held that after their defeat, the Arab countries would eventually be forced to accept the existence of Israel and perhaps even reach a peace agreement. For this reason, Sharett reasoned, Israel should not pour fuel on the fire and should instead maintain its strength, defend itself when there is no other choice, and certainly not initiate military action before peace or acquiescence was achieved.

In his capacity as Prime Minister, Sharett acquired political power that could not be ignored. Although he was a uniformed officer in a democratically structured country, Dayan was very much a product of the culture of the newly established state of Israel, in which the relationship between the army and the elected civilian government had not yet taken proper form. He was rough, aggressive, independent, and devoid of the anxieties of those who immigrated to Israel from the Diaspora.

Dayan also understood that a new round of warfare would inevitably set the stage for the one to follow, unless it was followed by a peace treaty that was beneficial to all parties. The aim of the war would be to induce Egypt and the other Arab countries that would undoubtedly follow to sign a peace treaty with Israel.

Thus, the argument between Dayan and Sharett had not to do with the goal but rather with the method of achieving it. Dayan not only voiced his opinion within internal discussions of the I. General Staff but also openly confronted Prime Minister Sharett and even worked to bring Ben-Gurion back into the government.

However, things changed after Ben-Gurion returned to the government in February Ben-Gurion adopted the C. When the Egyptians closed the Straits of Tiran which control the passage from the Gulf of Aqaba to the Red Sea to Israeli shipping, Dayan and Ben-Gurion legitimately argued that the action was a casus belli, and it was decided to seize the Straits on the assumption that such an action could potentially evolve into a war.

Britain's military strength was spread throughout the region, including the vast military complex at Suez with a garrison of some 80, making it one of the largest military installations in the world.

The Suez base was considered an important part of Britain's strategic position in the Middle East; however, increasingly it became a source of growing tension in Anglo-Egyptian relations. Unrest began to manifest itself in the growth of radical political groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and an increasingly hostile attitude towards Britain and its presence in the country. Added to this anti-British fervour was the role Britain had played in the creation of Israel.

In Octoberthe Egyptian government unilaterally abrogated the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty ofthe terms of which granted Britain a lease on the Suez base for 20 more years. The price of such a course of action was a steady escalation in increasingly violent hostility towards Britain and British troops in Egypt, which the Egyptian authorities did little to curb.

Why did Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal? | Yahoo Answers

On 25 JanuaryBritish forces attempted to disarm a troublesome auxiliary police force barracks in Ismailiaresulting in the deaths of 41 Egyptians. Post Egyptian revolution period The examples and perspective in this article deal primarily with the United Kingdom and do not represent a worldwide view of the subject. You may improve this articlediscuss the issue on the talk pageor create a new articleas appropriate.

April Learn how and when to remove this template message In the s the Middle East was dominated by four distinct but interlinked struggles. The first was the geopolitical battle for influence between the United States and the Soviet Union known as the Cold War.

The second was the anti-colonial struggle of Arab nationalists against the two remaining imperial powers, Britain and France. The third was the Arab—Israeli disputeand the fourth was the race between different Arab states for the leadership of the Arab world, [39] known as the Arab Cold War. Egypt and Britain Britain's desire to mend Anglo-Egyptian relations in the wake of the coup saw the country strive for rapprochement throughout and Part of this process was the agreement, into terminate British rule in Sudan by in return for Cairo's abandoning of its claim to suzerainty over the Nile Valley region.

In OctoberBritain and Egypt concluded an agreement on the phased evacuation of British troops from the Suez base, the terms of which agreed to withdrawal of all troops within 20 months, maintenance of the base to be continued, and for Britain to hold the right to return for seven years.

In particular, Iraq's increasingly amicable relations with Britain were a threat to Nasser's desire to see Egypt as head of the Arab world. The creation of the Baghdad Pact in seemed to confirm Nasser's fears that Britain was attempting to draw the Eastern Arab World into a bloc centred upon Iraq, and sympathetic to Britain.

Egypt and the Arab leadership In regard to the Arab leadership, particularly venomous was the feud between Nasser and the Prime Minister of Iraq, Nuri el-Said, for Arab leadership, with the Cairo-based Voice of the Arabs radio station regularly calling for the overthrow of the government in Baghdad.

The loss of Egypt's claim to Sudan, coupled with the continued presence of Britain at Suez for a further two years, led to domestic unrest including an assassination attempt against him in October The tenuous nature of Nasser's rule caused him to believe that neither his regime, nor Egypt's independence would be safe until Egypt had established itself as head of the Arab world. It will take a lot of stuff to do a job there". It's hard to put ourselves back in this period. There was really a definite fear of hostilities, of an active Russian occupation of the Middle East physically, and you practically hear the Russian boots clumping down over the hot desert sands.

It was a source of constant puzzlement to American officials in the s that the Arab states and the Israelis had seemed to have more interest in fighting each other rather than uniting against the Soviet Union. American policy was torn between a desire to maintain good relations with NATO allies such as Britain and France who were also major colonial powers, and a desire to align Third World nationalists with the Free World camp.

How can I go to my people and tell them I am disregarding a killer with a pistol sixty miles from me at the Suez Canal to worry about somebody who is holding a knife a thousand miles away?

Why did Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal?

After he returned to Washington, Dulles advised Eisenhower that the Arab states believed "the United States will back the new state of Israel in aggressive expansion. Our basic political problem Zhou recommended that Khrushchev treat Nasser as a potential ally. Marshal Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia, who also came to know Nasser at Bandung told Khrushchev in a meeting that "Nasser was a young man without much political experience, but if we give him the benefit of the doubt, we might be able to exert a beneficial influence on him, both for the sake of the Communist movement, and